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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by virtue of § 78-2a-3(2)(j), U.C.A.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW and
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue No, 1: Whether the trial court erred in awarding Appellant only $3,000 in
attorney fees instead of $11,377 as requested by Appellant and supported by affidavit and
detailed hilling records, and wliieh ivqtiesled ammmf did nul im hide lime spent at Ina!
and on post-trial proceedings. This issue was part of a final order of the trial court and
appealable as a matter of right as provided by Rules 3 and 4 of Utah R. App. P.
Standard of Re vie w: ' I lie amount .mil reasonableness of a ln.il i miff's award ml
attorney fees is ordinarily a question of law with some measure of discretion given to the
trial court in applying the reasonableness standard to a given set of facts, i.e., it is a mixed
question of law and fact. See Salmon v Di i i is County 916 P.2d 890, 892 ( ( J tali 1996);
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994); Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine,
830 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1992); Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988
(Utah 1988).
However, the sufficiency of a trial couifs findings that support an award of attorney
fees is reviewed under a correction-of-error standard. See Anderson v. Doms,
1999 UT App 20 \* Ahhoii|:iji inal njutU/-. are normal!) afforded hioad diserelinn in
determining what constitutes a reasonable fee, such an award "must be based on the

_1„

evidence and supported by findings of fact." See id.; Salmon v. Davis County,
916 P.2d 890,893 (Utah 1996).
Issue No, 2: Whether the trial court erred in concluding that a Nevada order that
changed the child support obligation of the parties was ambiguous on the question of
whether the order also eliminated a previous award of alimony in favor of
Appellant/Petitioner. This issue was part of a final order of the trial court and appealable
as a matter of right as provided by Rules 3 and 4 of Utah R. App. P.
Standard of Review: The trial court's interpretation of a prior judicial order
constitutes a conclusion of law. See Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461,
464 (Utah 1996); State v. Montoya, 887 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1994). Also, whether a
writing is ambiguous or not is a conclusion of law. See e.g., Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d
1234, 1251 (Utah 1998); Alfv. State Farm Fire & Cos., 850 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah
1993). A conclusion of law is reviewed under the correction of error standard with no
particular deference given to the trial court's ruling. See S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 439,44041 (Utah 1998); Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998).
Issue No. 3: Whether the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that
Appellant's/Petitioner's failure to previously request unpaid alimony bars her from
seeking reimbursement for such unpaid alimony. This issue was part of a final order of
the trial court and appealable as a matter of right as provided by Rules 3 and 4 of
Utah R. App. P.
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Standard of Review: Where no statute of limitations barred the collection of
unpaid alimony, the trial court's application of the doctrine of laches (without explicitly
stating so) constitutes a conclusion of law. See Anderson v. Doms, 1999 UT App 207.
Also, whether a statute of limitations has expired constitutes a conclusion of law. See
Estates v. Tibbs, 979 P.2d 823, 824 (Utah 1999); Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 977 P.2d
1226, 1228 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). A conclusion of law is reviewed under the correction
of error standard with no particular deference given to the trial court's ruling. See S.S. v.
State; 972 P.2d 439,440-41 (Utah 1998); Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah
1998).
Issue No. 4: Whether the trial court erred when it concluded that the provisions of
§ 78-45-7.15(8), U.C.A., are not applicable to a Nevada decree of divorce, even though
Appellee/Respondent first sought jurisdiction in the State of Utah by registering the
foreign decree and then sought to enforce the decree against Appellant/Petitioner for one
half of the medical bills paid by him. This issue was part of a final order of the trial court
and appealable as a matter of right as provided by Rules 3 and 4 of Utah R. App. P.
Standard of Review: The trial court's choice of law constitutes a conclusion of
law. See Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438,442 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Shaw v. Layton
Constr. Co., 872 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). A conclusion of law is reviewed
under the correction of error standard with no particular deference given to the trial
court's ruling. See S.S. v. State, 972 P.2d 439,440-41 (Utah 1998); Orton v. Carter, 970
P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998).
-3-

RELEVANT STATUTES
§§ 30-3-3(1) and 30-3-5(6), U.C.A. (2002)1
§ 30-3-3. Award of costs, attorney and witness fees.
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and in any
action to establish an order of custody, parent-time, child support,
alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, the court may order
a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert
witness fees, of the other party to enable the other party to prosecute or
defend the action. The order may include provision for costs of the
action.
§ 30-3-5. . . . Custody and parent-time . . .
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a
parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by a grandparent or
other member of the immediate family pursuant to Section 78-32-12.2
where a visitation or parent-time right has been previously granted by
the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party
because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered
visitation or parent-time.
§§ 78-45-7.15(8) and (9), U.C.A.
(8) A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written
verification of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other
parent within 30 days of payment.
(9) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, a
parent incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive
credit for the expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the
expenses if that parent fails to comply with Subsections (7) and (8).

1

§ 30-3-5 was amended effective May 5, 2003 to add subsection (4), which caused
the renumbering of subsection (6) as subsection (7). Since the subject trial and judgment
were prior to May 5, 2003, the relevant subsection is herein referred to as subsection (6).
-4-

Uniform Interstate Family Support Act
"UIFSA"
§ 78-45f-101. Definitions.
In this chapter:
(16) "Responding state" means a state in which a proceeding is
filed or to which a proceeding is forwarded for filing from an initiating
state under this chapter or a law or procedure substantially similar to this
chapter, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, or the
Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.
(17) "Responding tribunal" means the authorized tribunal in a
responding state.
(21) "Support order" means a judgment, decree, or order, whether
temporary, final, or subject to modification, for the benefit of a child, a
spouse, or a former spouse, which provides for monetary support, health
care, arrearages, or reimbursement, and may include related costs and
fees, interest, income withholding, attorneys fees, and other relief.
§ 78-45f-102. Tribunal of state.
The district court and the Department of Human Services are the
tribunals of this state.
§ 78-45f-303. Application of law of state.
Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, a responding tribunal
of this state shall:
(1) apply the procedural and substantive law, including the rules on
choice of law, generally applicable to similar proceedings originating in
this state and may exercise all powers and provide all remedies available
in those proceedings; and
(2) determine the duty of support and the amount payable in
accordance with the law and support guidelines of this state.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction and Background:
In 1987, the parties were married in the State of Utah. In 1997, the parties were
divorced in the State of Nevada. There are two minor children from this marriage. The
parties and their children have resided in the State of Utah since at least 2001.
After the parties were married, Ms. Colleli was diagnosed with Multiple Sclerosis
("MS") and has not been gainfully employed since approximately 1989. She was
determined to be permanently disabled by the Social Security Administration, and she
requires the aid of a wheelchair for her general movement. Ms. Colleli resides in an
assisted living facility and is financially supported by SSI and Medicaid. She has no
access to a vehicle and she cannot drive a vehicle even if she had access to one.
The initial Nevada divorce decree awarded alimony and custody of the children to
Ms. Colleli. The Nevada Court modified the decree twice, transferring custody of the
children to Mr. Colleli and modifying the amount of alimony to be paid by him.
After Ms. Colleli returned to Utah and while she was residing in a long term care
facility, she requested that Mr. Colleli bring the children to the care facility for parenting
time. Mr. Colleli refused. Ms. Colleli first requested legal help from the Legal Aid
Society of Salt Lake, but her request was denied. Another resident at the care facility
befriended Ms. Colleli and he requested his attorney to help her obtain statutory parenting
time with her two children. That request led to Ms. Colleli's present counsel, who
represented Ms. Colleli throughout all proceedings in the trial court and this appeal.
-6-

After retaining counsel, Ms. Colleli qualified under Medicaid's FlexCare Program
and was transferred to Regent's Assisted Living facility (now Wentworth Assisted
Living), a relatively new facility in Midvale, Utah. It is at this residence where parenting
time takes place and where the children's transportation to and from is required.
Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings, and Disposition:
During all proceedings in the trial court the parties and their two minor children
resided in Utah. As will be addressed in greater detail below, the foreign Nevada decree,
Ms. Colleli's indigence, Ms. Colleli's disability, and Mr. Colleli's intransigence on the
issue of transportation complicated and prolonged the proceedings in the trial court.
This appeal arises from post-divorce matters concerning (1) Mr. Colleli's refusal to
provide parenting time and the associated transportation for the minor children to realize
such parenting time; (2) unpaid alimony by Mr. Colleli; and (3) Ms. Colleli's unpaid
medical expenses for the minor children.
Ms. Colleli, filed in November 2001 a petition to modify the decree of divorce to
(1) permit her to have statutory parenting time with her two minor children; and
(2) reduce the amount of child support to the minimum allowed by Utah law. After a year
of motions, hearings, mediation, and discovery, a trial was held in January 2003.
Ms. Colleli prevailed on all issues. Judgment was entered against Mr. Colleli. The
judgment ordered Mr. Colleli to permit statutory parenting time and to provide the
necessary transportation for the minor children during parenting time. The judgment also
reduced Ms. Colleli's monthly child support payments to $20, the minimum allowed by
-7-

Utah Law. The judgment also included an award of attorney fees to Ms. Colleli.
Awarding such a small fraction of her fees gave rise to the First Issue herein.
Very early in the proceedings and nearly a year before trial, Ms. Colleli filed a
Motion for an Order to Show Cause against Mr. Colleli for unpaid alimony. Ms. Colleli's
motion was denied based on the trial court's interpretation of a Nevada order and also
based on the trial court's application of the doctrine of laches. The denial of her motion
gave rise to the Second and Third Issues herein.
Shortly after trial and six days after Ms. Colleli began collecting the judgment
entered in her favor, Mr. Colleli filed a Motion for an Order to Show Cause against
Ms. Colleli for one-half of the children's medical bills that he allegedly paid from 1999
through February 2003. Although Mr. Colleli failed to provide to Ms. Colleli any prior
written verification as required by § 78-45-7.15(8), U.C.A., the trial court entered
judgment against Ms. Colleli. The trial court ruled that § 78-45-7.15(8), U.C.A., was not
applicable, since the divorce decree was entered by a Nevada court and did not include
the requirements of § 78-45-7.15(8), U.C.A. Granting Mr. Colleli's motion and entering
judgment against Ms. Colleli gave rise to the Fourth Issue herein.
Statement of Facts Relevant to Issues Presented:
The two issues raised in Ms. Colleli's petition were narrow but substantially
important: (a) statutory parenting time; and (b) the amount of child support. However,
the path to trial and judgment was unexpectedly tortuous, lengthy, and expensive. Since
the trial court entered judgment in favor of Ms. Colleli on both issues, those issues are not
-8-

challenged on appeal. Rather, Ms. Colleli's appeal primarily focuses on the trial court's
substantial reduction of Ms. Colleli's requested attorney fees.2
The relevant facts underlying the reasonableness of attorney fees are the procedural
aspects of the trial court case and what or who caused the litigation to be prolonged. It is
precisely those facts that necessarily form the basis of any award of attorney fees.
The trial court admitted that it did not review those procedural facts or any billing
records prior to expressing an opinion on the amount of attorney fees to be awarded.
(R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 58)(A-1).3 Rather, the trial court opined that $3,000 was a
reasonable amount to resolve the issues raised in Ms. Colleli's petition. Id. Ms. Colleli
contends that such facts could not reasonably lead to the substantial reduction of fees
entered by the trial court. Accordingly, those facts are recited herein in great detail.
On October 4 and 16, 2001, Ms. Colleli first sent letters to Mr. Colleli for the purpose
of requesting statutory visitation. (R. at 325-26); see also, (R. at 620/Trial Tr.
at 9-10)(A-l). On October 29, 2001, counsel for Ms. Colleli also sent a letter to
Mr. Colleli requesting statutory visitation. (R. at 327).
On November 1, 2001, Mr. Colleli filed or caused to be filed an authenticated copy
of an Nevada Order that modified the original divorce decree. (R. at 1-5)(A-12). Since

2

In addition, other orders entered prior to and subsequent to trial were timely
added to Ms. Colleli's appeal. These orders give rise to Issues 2, 3 and 4 herein.
3

Those citations that reference documents that are also included as an Addendum
to this Brief, the form "(A-nn)" will be used where "nn" is the number of the Addendum
where such document can also be found.
-9-

Mr. Colleli refused Ms. Colleli's request for visitation, she filed on November 13, 2001 a
Verified Petition to Modify Decree. (R. at 6-16).
On the same day, November 13, 2001, Ms, Colleli also filed a Motion for Temporary
Order and Appointment of Guardian ad Litem. (R. at 17-20). On December 3, 2001, the
parties appeared before the Commissioner for hearing on Ms. Colleli's Motion for
Temporary Order and Appointment of Guardian ad Litem. (R. at 23-24). Mr. Colleli was
not at that time represented by counsel.4 Id.
The Commissioner's Minute Entry ordered parenting time to commence, although
such parenting time was limited because of Ms. Colleli's then living accommodations.5
Id. The Commissioner also ordered the parties to use mediation to resolve any further
disputes over parenting time. Id.
The Temporary Order was prepared by Ms. Colleli's counsel. It was first submitted
to Mr. Colleli's counsel for approval. No objections were filed.6 On January 9, 2002, the
Order was entered by the trial court. (R. at 80). The Order also required Mr. Colleli to
provide transportation for the minor children. (R. at 81).
4

It is not known exactly when Mr. Colleli retained counsel, but he had counsel as
early as December 18, 2001, since he was represented by counsel at a hearing on that
date. (R. 40).
5

At that time, Ms. Colleli was residing in a long-term care facility and could not
reasonably accommodate overnight visits by her two children.
6

No citation to the Record is required, since the Record contains nothing to
suggest that an objection to the Temporary Order was filed by Mr. Colleli or his counsel.
However, the Record shows that Mr. Colleli's counsel was served on December 18, 2001
with a copy of the proposed Temporary Order. (R. 82-83)
-10-

On January 16,2002, a Certificate of Default was entered against Mr. Colleli.
(R. at 88). Six days later on January 22, 2002, Mr. Colleli, by and through counsel, filed
an Answer to Ms. Colleli's Petition. (R. at 89).
On February 27, 2002, the parties attended mediation. (R. at 115, 599).7 Since
Ms. Colleli is indigent and disabled, she can not provide transportation. (R. at 198). After
mediation, the transportation issue remained. (R. at 115); (R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 44)(A-1).
When mediation failed to resolve the issue of transportation, Mr. Colleli formally
objected to being responsible for transportation of the children by filing a Motion to Set
Aside [the Temporary] Order and Default. (R. 124). At a hearing on April 18, 2002, the
Commissioner entered a Minute Entry that set aside Mr. Colleli's Default and the
provision in the Temporary Order that required Mr. Colleli to provide transportation for
the children. (R. at 162). The Commissioner also recommended that a Guardian ad Litem
be appointed for the children. Id. Shortly thereafter, on April 30, 2002, the Guardian ad
Litem entered his appearance. (R. at 164).
After mediation failed to resolve the issue of transportation, and after Mr. Colleli
filed his Rule 60(b) Motion to set aside, Ms. Colleli commenced discovery by issuing to
Mr. Colleli various interrogatories and requests for documents and admissions.

7

The Certificate shows that mediation was set for February 27, 2002, and the box
entitled "partial agreement reach" is checked. (R. at 115) However, the trial court's
docket shows an entry on March 7,2002: "partial agreement reached (transportation no
resolved)" (R. at 599) Also, the date shown in the docket incorrectly states the date of the
referral to mediation and not the actual date of mediation. Id.; (R. at 115)
-11-

(R. at 144). When the Commissioner removed from the Temporary Order Mr. Colleli's
duty to provide transportation, Ms. Colleli filed her Notice to depose Mr. Colleli on
May 14, 2002. (R. at 153)(R. at 337-58)(A-9).
The deposition of Mr. Colleli was particularly difficult. Mr. Colleli was evasive,
untruthful, and asserted that he had no knowledge of numerous facts. See, e.g.,
(R. at 348-51, 353-55)(A-9).
On June 5, 2002, the Guardian ad Litem submitted his Report and Recommendation.
(R. at 196-99). His report recommended that statutory parenting time be permitted and
that Mr. Colleli provide the necessary transportation for the minor children. (R. at 198).
Five days later, on June 12, 2002, Mr. Colleli filed his Financial Declaration and
"Proposed Settlement" in support of his Certificate of Readiness for Trial.
(R. at 203-09)(A-l 1). Under the heading of "Visitation," Mr. Colleli wrote the following:
"Once a week 2-3 hrs, every other weekend, Dawn [Ms. Colleli] to
provide (including bus pass transportation)"
(R.at209)(A-ll).
On August 6, 2002, a pretrial settlement conference was held with the Commissioner.
(R. at 222). At the settlement conference, there was no resolution of the transportation
issue and no resolution of attorney fees.8 Id.

8

Through the date of the pre-trial settlement conference with the Commissioner,
Ms. Colleli's legal fees were $7,843. (R. at 271-80). At the settlement conference,
Mr. Colleli offered to pay a mere $900 toward Ms. Colleli's attorney fees, and he
maintained that offer through the date of trial. (R. at 620/Trail Tr. at 67); (R. at 297)
-12-

On December 23,2002, a pretrial conference was held with the trial court.
(R. at 232). The trial court ordered a bench trial be set for January 14,2003; that witness
lists be submitted by January 3, 2003; and that proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law be submitted by January 10, 2003. Id. Ms. Colleli filed her Designation of
Witnesses, (R. at 233), and her Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
(R. at 260). Ms. Colleli also submitted an 11-page Trial Brief, but it is not in the Record.
At the pretrial conference, Mr. Colleli's regular counsel, Steven Russell, was not
present. (R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 45)(A-1). Rather, Mr. Smith had substituted for
Mr. Russell that day. Id. The substitution of counsel likely led to some uncertainty as to
whether or not Mr. Colleli had agreed to provide transportation for the children.
The Trial Transcript, dated January 14,2003, and the Hearing Transcript, dated
March 31, 2003, provide answers to the question of when Mr. Colleli agreed to be
responsible for transportation.9 The trial court concluded that the issue of transportation
remained unresolved until the day of trial. Specifically, Judge Anthony Quinn presided at
the trial and at the Rule 59 hearing. After testimony was taken, Judge Quinn stated:
"The position at the pretrial conference we had in this case . . . you
weren't there, Mr. Russell, but Mr. Smith was there.... "He indicated
that that was still an outstanding issue, the transportation."
(R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 45)(A-1).

9

Two transcripts were prepared: one for the trial on January 14, 2003 and one for
a hearing held on March 31, 2003. To conveniently distinguish herein between the two
transcripts, the notations "Trial Transcript" or "Trial Tr." and "Hearing Transcript" or
"Hearing Tr" are used. The Complete transcripts are attached hereto as Addenda 1 and 2.
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"I'll take judicial notice of the fact that at the time of the pretrial
conference in this case I was informed by both sides that the issue of
who would be responsible for transportation was still an open issue."
(R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 45-6)(A-l).
"I was vague at that pretrial conference - the final pretrial conference of
whether [the transportation issue] was still an open issue. I came away
with the impression that it was still an open issue, and I've given
considerable thought to that issue since the time of the pretrial
conference."
(R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 56)(A-1).
At the subsequent hearing on Ms. Colleli's Rule 59 Motion, Judge Quinn also
stated the following:10
"I agree with you that we did not have an unequivocal agreement at [the
pretrial conference] that the [Mr, Colleli] would provide transportation."
(R. at 621/Hearing Tr. at 14)(A-2).
At the beginning of trial, held on January 14, 2003, Mr. Colleli agreed to fully
comply with the Guardian ad Litem's recommendations, including providing
transportation for the minor children during parenting time with Ms. Colleli.
(R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 3)(A-1). That left only the issue of attorney fees. Specifically,
whether attorney fees be awarded and in what amount. (R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 4)(A-1).

10

On February 20, 2003, Ms. Colleli filed a Rule 59 Motion to Open Judgment
and Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. A hearing was held on
March 31, 2003, at which Judge Quinn presided. A Hearing Transcript was prepared and
is part of the Record. The Hearing Transcript is also included herein as Addendum 2.
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Consistent with the three-pronged analysis set forth in Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), the trial began by first obtaining evidence to answer (1) whether
Ms. Colleli was in need of financial assistance; and (2) whether Respondent had the
ability to pay her fees. Two witnesses offered testimony: Ms. Colleli and Mr. Colleli.
(R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 2)(A-1).
The trial court found that Ms. Colleli was in need of financial assistance and that
Mr. Colleli had the means to pay her attorney fees. (R. at 298-99)(A-3). However, the
trial court found the attorney fees to be "excessive given the limited assets of the parties,
the narrow issues in the case and the results obtained." (R. at 299)(A-3).
Prior to trial, Ms. Colleli's attorney fees were $11,377. (R. at 267-85). At the
conclusion of the trial, Judge Quinn, without a review of the affidavit of fees or billing
records submitted by Ms. Colleli's counsel,11 opined that $3,000 was a reasonable amount
for attorney fees. (R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 58)(A-1).
The trial court stated:
I could go through and look at individual entries and try and determine
what fees were reasonably expended and what fees were not reasonably
expended, and I'm happy to do that if you think that's an appropriate
exercise.
But it's my view that something around $3,000 is an amount that would
be reasonably necessary to prosecute the actual issues involved in this case.
(R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 58)(A-1).

11

Ms. Colleli's counsel submitted at the beginning of trial his affidavit of fees
with detailed billings records. (R. at 267-285).
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Judge Quinn relied on an extract of Mr. Colleli's deposition that was never entered as
evidence nor filed with the trial court. (R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 57)(A-1). Judge Quinn
stated that he only quickly reviewed it during the trial. Id. The document relied on by the
trial court (the "Extract") was prepared solely to impeach Mr. Colleli during his
examination at trial. The Extract was never marked as an exhibit nor submitted to nor
filed with the trial court prior to or during trial.12
Counsel for Ms. Colleli tried on multiple occasions to correct the misunderstanding
that Judge Quinn had about the Extract. (R. at 311), (R. at 621/Hearing Tr. at 6-7)(A-2).
But Judge Quinn continued to insist that he had the full deposition and that he had
reviewed all of its pages. (R. at 621/Hearing Tr. at 7)(A-2). However, there is no such
other copy of the deposition anywhere in the Record. In response, Judge Quinn stated:
"Well, one [deposition] was submitted to me is sequential from page one
to the end of the deposition with no pages omitted."
(R. at 621/Hearing Tr. at 7)(A-2).
After trial, counsel for Ms. Colleli prepared and submitted findings of fact and
conclusions of law. (R. at 287-92). Counsel for Mr. Colleli approved them as to form. Id.
Notwithstanding approval by counsel for both parties, the trial court elected to draft and
enter its own findings and conclusions. (R. at 296-300)(A-3).

12

As evidence of this fact, the Extract is filed in the Record in chronological order
of the deposition, May 14, 2002. (R. at 179-195)(A-10). The Extract is not marked as an
exhibit, nor filed in the Record on or near the date of trial, nor attached to any motion or
pleading. The only complete copy of the deposition is the one attached as Exhibit D to
Ms. Colleli's Memorandum in Support of her Rule 59 Motion. (R. at 337-58)(A-9).
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In its findings, the trial court found that 90% of Mr. Colleli's deposition was devoted
to "exploring Mr. Colleli's financial condition, which was only relevant to the issue of
attorney's fees." (R. at 300). However, a careful review of the complete deposition shows
that questions about Mr. Colleli's financial condition first begin on page 44, and there are
only 82 pages of questions and answers. (R. at 337-58)(A-9).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Issue No. 1;
The trial court erred when it reduced Ms. Colleli's requested attorney fees from
$11,377 to $3,000, because the facts can not reasonably lead to such a reduction of fees.
The trial court acted arbitrarily and without analysis when it first opined that the amount
of fees should be $3,000, and it admitted that it had not reviewed the billing records.
Second, the trial court's findings are insufficient and contrary to the evidence in the
record. From 15 pages of billing records, the trial court cited only one entry that it
considered to be unnecessary or wasteful, and it failed to consider the conduct of
Mr. Colleli. But for his actions, the substantive issues could have been resolved quickly.
Third, the trial court's findings on when the transportation issue was resolved are
internally inconsistent. Findings No. 6, 8 and 22 purportedly answer that issue. Only
Finding No. 8 is correct because it is supported by several statements made by the trial
court during and subsequent to trial. There is no evidence to support the trial court's
Findings 6 and 22, and which are intended solely to support a reduction of fees.
-17-

Fourth, the trial court's findings about the deposition of Mr. Colleli are analytically
flawed, erroneous, and unsupported by the record. Even a cursory examination of either
the complete deposition or the Extract shows that the trial court's analysis and
conclusions about the deposition's content are clearly erroneous.
Fifth, the trial court improperly discounted the amount of time expended to discover
Mr. Colleli's financial condition, although Ms. Colleli had a duty to show that Mr. Colleli
had the financial means to pay her attorney fees.
Sixth, the trial court erred when it limited Ms. Colleli's fees based on the number of
and narrowness of the issues. This is contrary to Utah Law. Limiting fees based on the
amount or extent of the controversy is inappropriate without a consideration of which
party caused the protracted proceedings.
Seventh, the issue of transportation was not amicably resolved prior to trial because
of Mr. Colleli's intransigence. The trial court admitted that it did not know why the
parties did not get together sooner. The trial court overlooked the fact that the parties
attended mediation within a few weeks of the first hearing. The trial court failed to make
even a basic inquiry into which party caused the proceedings to be more extensive than
they might otherwise have been. Had it done so, it would have readily observed that
Mr. Colleli was the sole impediment to resolving the issues.
Eighth, the trial court's reduction of fees is contrary to law and public policy. Utah's
divorce laws are intended to provide attorney fees to the prevailing party and to deter bad
conduct. Ms. Colleli had and has no financial means to retain an attorney. Any attorney
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that helps her should be able to rely on Utah's Statutes to receive compensation by way of
an award of attorney fees. Otherwise, Ms. Colleli would never in the future be able to
retain counsel to vindicate her rights.

Issue No. 2:
The trial court denied Ms. Colleli's attempt to collect unpaid alimony. The basis for
the request is a Nevada Divorce Decree and a subsequent "February Order" that modified
the manner of calculating the amount of alimony. The trial court found ambiguity in a
subsequent Nevada order (the "May Order"). Because of that ambiguity, the trial court
ruled that the May Order eliminated alimony. While the May Order changed custody and
child support obligations of the parties, it was entirely void of any mention of alimony. It
was captioned as "Child Custody" and dealt exclusively with custody and the
corresponding obligation for child support. The trial court somehow linked the need for
child support with the need for alimony, but there is no basis in law for such connection.

Issue No, 3:
In addition to finding ambiguity in the May Order, the trial court also applied the
doctrine of laches. It denied Ms. Colleli's Motion for Order to Show Cause because she
failed in the two and one-half years since the entry of the February Order to make a
demand for such alimony. The doctrine of laches is clearly not appropriate under Utah
Law and Utah Case Law supports a reversal of the trial court's denial.
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Issue No. 4:
Almost immediately after Ms. Colleli garnished Mr. Colleli's bank account to
enforce the judgment entered against him, he filed a Motion for Order to Show Cause to
obtain judgment against her for one-half of the medical bills that he allegedly paid from
1999 through February 2003. During that period of time, Mr. Colleli failed entirely to
provide timely written verification of such bills as required by § 78-45-7.15(8), U.C.A.
However, the trial court refused to apply § 78-45-7.15(8), U.C.A., because the Nevada
Decree did not contain the provisions included within § 78-45-7.15(8), U.C.A.
Since the trial court ignored UIFSA ("Uniform Interstate Family Support Act"),
particularly § 78-45f-303, U.C.A., which requires the trial court to apply Utah Law for
any support order, including an order for medical bills, the trial court erred and its order
should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
ISSUE NO. 1:
Whether the trial court erred in awarding Ms. Colleli only $3,000 in
attorney fees instead of $11,377 as requested by her and supported by
affidavit and detailed billing records, and which requested amount did
not include time spent at trial and on post-trial proceedings.

Ms. Colleli is aware that she must marshal all of the evidence in the record that could
possibly support the trial court's reduction of attorney fees. In doing so, she will show
that (1) the trial court arbitrarily arrived at the amount of fees; (2) the trial court failed to
reasonably examine the record in formulating its findings of fact; and (3) had the trial
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court reasonably examined the record, the evidence therein could not reasonably lead to
such a substantial reduction of fees.
As a threshold matter, the basis for an award of attorney fees lies in Utah's Divorce
Statutes: §§ 30-3-3(1) and 30-3-5(6), U.C.A., (collectively the "Statutes"). The Statutes
provide:
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3,4, or 6, and in any
action to establish an order of custody, parent-time, child support,
alimony,..., the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees,
and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party to
enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a
parent-time order by a parent,... the court may award to the prevailing
party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the
prevailing party because of the other partyfs failure to provide or
exercise court-ordered visitation or parent-time.

The trial court erred when it reduced Ms. Colleli's requested attorney fees from
$11377 to $3,000, because the facts can not reasonably lead to such a substantial
reduction of fees.
Ms. Colleli prevailed in every aspect of her petition. On the day of trial, Mr. Colleli
finally agreed to provide the necessary transportation for the minor children's visits with
Ms. Colleli. (R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 3)(A-1). Upon his stipulation, the only remaining issue
for trial was whether attorney fees should be awarded to Ms. Colleli, and if so, in what
amount. (R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 4)(A-1).
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A. The trial court acted arbitrarily and without analysis:
At the conclusion of testimony at trial, the trial court stated:
I could go through and look at individual entries and try and
determine what fees were reasonably expended and what fees were not
reasonably expended, and I'm happy to do that if you think that's an
appropriate exercise.
But it's my view that something around $3,000 is an amount that
would be reasonably necessary to prosecute the actual issues involved in
this case.
(R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 58)(A-1).
The trial court acted arbitrarily when it reached into thin air and picked a nice
sounding number like $3,000 as the amount of fees that should be awarded. Id. The trial
court failed to perform any analysis or review the affidavit of fees submitted to it prior to
announcing the amount to be awarded. Id. Although the findings of the trial court
indicate that it eventually reviewed the details of the affidavit of fees, the trial court did
not modify by one penny the initial award derived from its visceral conclusion. Except
for the deposition of Mr. Colleli, the trial court made no effort to identify legal activities
were unnecessary, wasteful, or unreasonable. (R. at 299-300).13
Although trial courts are normally afforded broad discretion in determining what
constitutes a reasonable fee, such award "must be based on the evidence and supported by
findings of fact." See Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 893 (Utah 1996). In the

13

Later, the trial stated in its Findings that it had "reviewed every entry on the
Affidavit of Attorney's Fees submitted by [Ms. Colleli]".
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instant case, the trial court appears to have taken a visceral approach in determining the
amount of attorney fees. Rather than deriving an amount of fees from an analysis of the
work performed, the trial court first set the amount of fees to be awarded and then
proceeded to justify that amount. The record clearly supports the sequence of the Court's
actions with respect to the amount of fees. After arbitrarily stating in open court an
amount of $3,000, the trial court then drafted its own findings to support such amount.14

B. The trial court failed to consider the conduct of Mr, Colleli and his attorney.
In determining the reasonableness of attorney fees, the trial court never once
examined or questioned the conduct of Mr. Colleli or his attorney nor did it consider
Mr. Colleli's intransigence on the issue of transportation. Moreover, the trial court failed
to examine the root cause of the extensive litigation. Had it done so, it would have found
that the actions and conduct of Mr. Colleli and his attorneys were the major causes. But
for their actions and intransigence on the issue of transportation, the matter could have
been resolved with the trial court's intervention in a few weeks or a few months at most.
In cases where attorney fees are substantially increased by one party's conduct and
motions, the prevailing party's request for attorney fees should not necessarily be limited
by the simplicity of the issues or claims. See Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985

14

After reviewing the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law that were
submitted to it and which were agreed by counsel for both parties, the trial court took it
upon itself to draft new findings of fact and conclusions of law that in large part were
intended to support its reduction of attorney fees. (R. at 296-300) (A-3)
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("The attorney fees incurred by the [plaintiff] were clearly much higher than they should
have been in this case, but they were higher because of the inconsistent and unmeritorious
positions taken by the [defendant]—not because of any extravagance or 'overkill' on the
[plaintiffs] part").
Had the trial court reasonably examined the actions of Mr. Colleli and his attorneys,
it would have observed the following:
1. After mediation, Mr. Colleli refused to accept responsibility for the
transportation of the minor children. (R. at 115); (R. at 620/Trial Tr.
atl4,44)(A-l).
2. Mr. Colleli and his attorney filed a Rule 60(b) Motion to set aside that
part of the Temporary Order that required Mr. Colleli to be responsible for
transportation of the minor children. (R. at 124); (R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 14)(A-1).
3. At his deposition on May 14, 2002, Mr. Colleli still refused to accept
responsibility for transportation. (R. at 348)(A-9).
4. After the Guardian ad Litem's Report and Recommendations, Mr. Colleli
submitted to the Commissioner his proposal for settlement. (R. at 209)(A-11) In
his proposal, Mr. Colleli again refused to accept responsibility for the
transportation of the minor children. Id.
5. At both the pretrial settlement conference with the Commissioner in
August 2002 and the pretrial conference with the trial court in December 2002,
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transportation of the minor children remained an issue for trial (R. at 620/Trial
Tr. at 45-46, 52-53)(A-l).

At each stage of the litigation listed above, the substantive issue of transportation
remained unresolved. In effect, Mr. Colleli steadfastly refused to accept responsibility for
such transportation. Not until the day of trial did Mr. Colleli clearly agree to be
responsible for transportation. Had he accepted responsibility earlier, the litigation would
have been substantially shortened. And with shortened litigation, the amount of attorney
fees would have been substantially less than they were.
C. The trial court's findings are internally inconsistent:
On January 28,2003, the trial court entered findings of fact. (R. at 296-300)(A-3).
Finding No. 8 states:
"Just before this case went to trial the parties reached a stipulation on
the substantive issues in the case and the trial proceeded only with
respect to the issue of attorney fees."
(R. at 291){emphasis added).
However, to support its rationale for reducing the amount of fees, the trial court
entered Findings No. 6 and 22, respectively:
"A pretrial [settlement] conference was held before Commissioner
Evans in the above-entitled matter on August 7, 2002. Substantial
agreement was reached on the substantive issues in the case at the
pretrial [settlement] conference. The primary reason the case was not
settled was because of petitioner's request for attorney's fees."
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"Substantial agreement on the substantive issues was reached in this
case in approximately June of 2002. Any attorney's fees expended by
petitioner after that date should be substantially discounted."
(R. at 297, 300)(A-3).
These findings are inconsistent with each other. The pretrial conference was on
December 23, 2002. (R. at 232). The trial was held on January 14, 2003. While the trial
court does not articulate its meaning for "just before this case went to trial," the plain
language of the trial court's words implies that agreement on the transportation issue must
have been reached on or near the date of trial, or January 14, 2003. But Findings 6 and 22
state that such agreement was reached much earlier, either in August or in June 2002.
These two findings obviously conflict with Finding No. 8, and they are not reliable.
The correct finding is Finding No. 8, since it is entirely consistent with the prior
statements made by the trial court at trial and at the subsequent Rule 59 hearing. During
the trial, Judge Quinn made the following statements:
"The position at the pretrial conference we had in this case . . . you
weren't there, Mr. Russell, but Mr. Smith was there.... "He indicated
that that was still an outstanding issue, the transportation."
(R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 45)(A-1).
"I'll take judicial notice of the fact that at the time of the pretrial
conference in this case I was informed by both sides that the issue of
who would be responsible for transportation was still an open issue."
(R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 45-46)(A-l).
"I was vague at that pretrial conference - the final pretrial conference of
whether [the transportation issue] was still an open issue. I came away
with the impression that it was still an open issue, and I've given
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considerable thought to that issue since the time of the pretrial
conference."
(R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 56)(A-1).
At the subsequent hearing on Ms. Colleli's Rule 59 Motion, Judge Quinn further
stated the following:
"I agree with you that we did not have an unequivocal agreement at [the
pretrial conference] that the [Mr. Colleli] would provide transportation."
(R. at 621/Hearing Tr. at 14)(A-2).

Each of the foregoing statements support the finding that the issue of transportation
was not resolved until trial. Therefore, these statements clearly support Finding No. 8,
and just as clearly they show that Findings 6 and 22 are erroneous.
However, even if Finding No. 22 were correct, the trial court entirely ignored the
attorney fees up to that point in time. The trial court suggests in Finding 22 that those
attorney fees that were incurred after June 2002 should be substantially reduced. But
what about the fees prior to June? The trial court merely ignores those fees.
Th issue of fees prior to June 2002 was brought to the trial court's attention at trial.
(R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 64)(A-1). Specifically, counsel for Ms. Colleli stated:
"I went through and calculated on the same affidavit here, and up
through the end of May - the Guardian ad Litem's report came out
June 5th. As of the end of May attorney's fees were $6,974 at that point
in time."
(R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 64)(A-1).
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So, even if the issue of transportation had been resolved in June 2002, the trial court
completely discarded the fees incurred up to that point in time.

D. The trial court's findings are not supported by the record:
Although the trial court admitted at trial that it had not reviewed the affidavit of fees,
it apparently did so before issuing its findings. The trial court's Finding No. 21 states:
"The [trial court] has reviewed every entry on the Affidavit of
Attorney's Fees submitted by petitioner. It appears that the litigation
over attorney's fees has dominated the way this case was pursued. For
example, the trial court has reviewed the deposition of Ralph Colleli.
Out of an 80-page deposition, only eight pages related to the substantive
issues in the case. The remaining time was spent exploring respondent's
financial condition, which was only relevant to the issue of attorney's
fees."
(R. at 299-300)(emphasis added).

1. The trial court cites only one example from the billing records:
First, it is significant that the trial court provided only one example from 15 pages of
detailed billing records. (R. at 267-85). Taking Mr. Colleli's deposition consisted of a
single entry out of about 65 entries. Id. Further, the amount of time spent on that one
activity represents less than 5% of the total time incurred, without counting the time at
trial and post-trial matters. Id. Nonetheless, the trial court provides only this one example
of what it considers as wasteful or unnecessary.
The trial court has obviously not provided sufficient evidence to support its statement
" . . . that the litigation over attorney's fees has dominated the way this case was pursued."
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What other evidence is there? The trial court presents no other evidence except pointing
to the deposition of Mr. Colleli.

2. The trial court never had a complete copy of the deposition and refused to
acknowledge or admit its error or confusion:
Second, and more troublesome, the trial court never had at its disposal a complete
copy of the deposition. Rather, the trial court only had an "extracted copy" that had been
prepared solely to impeach Mr. Colleli at trial. (R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 57)(A-1). The
Record contains only two copies of Mr. Colleli's deposition: (1) an extract prepared for
trial and located in the Record at 179-19515 (A-10); and (2) a complete copy filed as
Exhibit D to Ms. Colleli's Memorandum in Support of her Rule 59 Motion (R. at 337-58)
(A-9). The deposition examined by the trial court is clearly missing 20 out of 84 pages.
That is, nearly 25% of the pages of the deposition were missing from the version that the
trial court examined.
An examination of the Record reveals that the trial court is clearly incorrect about the
extracted copy of the deposition that it analyzed following the trial.16 The Extract's cover

15

Although the extract was prepared in January 2003, just in time for trial, the
indexer who organized and indexed the Record apparently filed all documents by date
sequence. This process placed the extracted copy near the date of the deposition rather
than the date of trial when such copy was inadvertently gathered up by the trial court.
16

At trial, the trial court admitted that it only briefly looked through the Extract.
(R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 57)(A-1). However, in its Findings the trial court states that "out of
an 80-page deposition, only eight pages related to the substantive issues in the case,"
indicating a more thorough examination of the Extract. (R. at 300)(A-3).
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page is found on page 179 of the Record. On the next page of the Record, page 180, one
would expect to find the first page of the deposition. Instead, the Extract begins with
page nine. This shows that the first eight pages of the deposition are missing, but the trial
court failed to recognize such missing pages. Further, the Extract consists of 16 pages in
the Record plus the cover page. Since there are four deposition pages for each page in the
Record, simple math shows that the Extract contains only 64 (4x16) deposition pages.
However, the last page of the Extract is numbered page 84. (R. at 195)(A-10).
Inexplicably, the trial court refused to understand or to acknowledge that the document it
examined is missing a quarter of its pages in the Record.
Therefore, the trial court's conclusion about the deposition is highly unreliable.
Since the trial court's conclusion is based on a substantially incomplete document, it
cannot be permitted to stand as a basis to deny Ms. Colleli's attorney fees.

3. The trial court's analysis is flawed:
Third, the trial court admitted that it only briefly "looked through" the deposition of
Mr. Colleli (the Extracted version). (R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 57)(A-1). As a consequence,
the trial court's conclusion about the content of Mr. Colleli's deposition lacks any hint of
thoroughness. The trial court's treatment of the deposition is similar to its treatment of
the attorney billing records where the trial admitted that it had not examined the records
prior to stating the amount of fees to be awarded. (R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 58)(A-1).
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Even a cursory examination of the Extract shows that the trial court is substantially
incorrect. For example, the Extract contains 16 pages in the Record. Yet, the first question
about Mr. Colleli's financial condition occurs on page 44 of the deposition, which is on the
seventh physical page of the Extract. (R. at 186)(A-10). That means that at least 6-7 pages
of the 16 pages in the Record were not devoted to Mr. Colleli's financial condition,
assuming, incorrectly, that all remaining pages were devoted to Mr. Colleli's financial
condition. But the trial court states in its Finding No. 21 that "out of an 80-page deposition,
only eight pages related to the substantive issues in the case." (R. at 300)(A-3). The trial
court then further states that:
"The remaining time was spent exploring [Mr. Colleli's] financial
condition, which was only relevant to the issue of attorney fees."
(R. at 300)(A-3)
The trial court implies that 72 out of 80 pages, or 90% of the deposition, related solely
to Mr. Colleli's financial condition. If the trial court were correct, then out of the 16 pages
it had in its possession, all but 1.6 pages would have been related to the financial condition
of Mr. Colleli. But such a conclusion is obviously not true, since the first question raised
about Mr. Colleli's financial condition is on page 44 of the deposition, or on the seventh
page of the extracted copy in the Record. (R. at 186)(A-10). So, even taking the "extracted
copy" as being a correct copy of the deposition, the trial court's analysis is clearly
erroneous.
In stark contrast, Ms. Colleli, in her Rule 59 Motion, provided a more thorough and
detailed analysis of Mr. Colleli's complete deposition: (R. at 312).
-31-

ANALYSIS OF DEPOSITION
Deposition
Pages

Number
of Pages

Percent of
Total Pages

17-44, 77-83

35

42%

Visitation and transportation issues

45-70, 74-76

29

35%

Ownership of and income from
Respondent's owned business

1-12

12

14%

Introduction and general background,
including marriage and places lived

13-16

4

5%

Nevada orders and who filed them

71-73

3

4%

Veracity issues as they relate to
Respondent's credibility

83

100%

TOTALS

Subject Matter

The foregoing analysis shows a far different result than that reached by the trial court
after its brief look through an extract of the deposition. The dominant issue was visitation
and transportation. Slightly more than 1/3 of the deposition was focused on Mr. Colleli's
income and assets. Had Mr. Colleli been more forthcoming, non-evasive, and truthful,
that 1/3 would have been an even smaller fraction. Mr. Colleli repeatedly lied throughout
his deposition and often feigned a lack of knowledge. See, e.g., (R. at 348-51, 353-55)
(A-9). Accordingly, the trial court's conclusion is clearly erroneous.
E. The trial court improperly discounted the amount of time expended to
discover Mr, Colleli9s financial condition:
While the Statutes form the basis for an award of attorney fees, such fees are only
awarded after consideration of the three-pronged analysis required by Muir. Although it
was clear at the outset that Ms. Colleli needed assistance with her fees, she had the burden
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of showing that Mr. Colleli had the means to pay her fees. After all, the Financial
Declaration that he had filed showed that he had no means to pay Ms. Colleli's fees.
(R. at 203-04)(A-l 1). His Declaration shows no salary or wages. Id. at 203. It shows
only that he receives $3,800 from "repayment of investment." Id. at 204. The Declaration
also shows that his living expenses are $3,842. Id. at 208. In effect, his expenses exceed
his "income." Based solely on his Financial Declaration, Mr. Colleli had no ability to pay
Ms. Colleli's attorney fees.
The trial court repeatedly stated and implied that attorney fees incurred to discover
Mr. Colleli's financial condition were unreasonable, as though such fees are unreasonable
as a matter of law. (R. at 299-300); (R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 57)(A-1). The trial court cites
no other example nor any other legal activity except for the deposition of Mr. Colleli.
The trial court first acknowledged the three factors set forth in Muir. (R. at 620/Trial
Tr. at 4)(A-1); (R. at 300)(A-3). After testimony from Ms. Colleli and Mr. Colleli, the
trial court next found that Ms. Colleli had a need for assistance with her fees and that
Mr. Colleli had the financial means to pay her fees. (R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 57-58)(A-l).
But for Mr. Colleli's testimony at trial, the trial court had no other evidence on which to
evaluate Mr. Colleli's financial condition, except for his Financial Declaration.
Therefore, without Mr. Colleli's testimony at trial, the trial court could not possibly have
found that Mr. Colleli had the financial means to pay Ms. Colleli's fees.
Mr. Colleli is self-employed. (R. at 206, 298)(A-11 and A-3 respectively). His
business tax returns show a loss. (R. at 212). His personal tax returns reflect his business
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loss. (R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 28-29, 34)(A-1). Moreover, Mr. CoUeli stated in his
deposition and again at trial that he made little or nothing from his business.
(R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 34)(A-1). Likewise, Mr. Colleli's Financial Declaration shows no
income from salary or wages and that his expenses exceed his "income." (R. at 203-08)
(A-l 1). Based on this evidence, a trier of fact could not reasonably conclude that
Mr. Colleli had the financial means to pay Ms. Colleli's attorney fees.
Formal discovery and detailed analyses were the only tools available to uncover
Mr. Colleli's true financial condition. These discovery steps included propounding
interrogatories, requesting and analyzing Mr. Colleli's financial records, taking the
deposition of Mr. Colleli, and with the aid of his accountant examining his tax returns.
The trial court was able to find sufficient evidence to conclude that Mr. Colleli had
sufficient financial means to pay Ms. Colleli's attorney fees, and such finding was
possible only because of the testimony of Mr. Colleli at trial. (R. at 298-99)(A-3).
Had Ms. Colleli's counsel merely forged ahead to trial on the sole issue of
transportation, as the trial court has suggested, the trial court would have been bound by
the factors set forth in Muir. Without Mr. Colleli's testimony at trial, the trial court
would have had no choice but to deny an award of attorney fees for Ms. Colleli, since
there would have been no evidence to support a contrary result. Accordingly, the
deposition of Mr. Colleli was essential to the determination that he had the means to pay
Ms. Colleli's attorney fees, despite Mr. Colleli's Financial Declaration.
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F. It was error for the trial court to reduce fees based on the number and
narrowness of the issues.
The trial court stated that the number and narrowness of the issues should have
required fewer attorney fees. (R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 56, 57, 70)(A-1). The trial court may
be correct had Mr. Colleli not been intransigent on the issue of transportation. The trial
court's reasoning is analogous to the common misapprehension that the amount in
controversy should dictate the amount of fees. In Dixie State Bank, the Utah Supreme
Court stated the following:
In addition, although the amount in controversy can be a factor in
determining a reasonable fee, care should be used in putting much
reliance on this factor. It is a simple fact in a lawyer's life that it takes
about the same amount of time to collect a note in the amount of SLOOP
as it takes to collect a note for $100,000. As stated in Cabrera:
The total amount of the attorneys fees awarded in this
case cannot be said to be unreasonable just because it is
greater than the amount recovered on the contract. The
amount of the damages awarded in a case does not place a
necessary limit on the amount of attorneys fees that can be
awarded.
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 990 (Utah 1988); American
Vending Servs. v. Morse, 881 P.2d 917 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
In the instant case, the transportation issue was singular and narrow. However,
Mr. Colleli took extraordinary steps to avoid responsibility for transportation. At
mediation, he refused to accept responsibility for transportation. (R. at 620/Trial Tr. at
14-44)(A-1). He then filed a Rule 60(b) Motion to remove the provision in the
Temporary Order that required him to provide transportation. (R. at 124). After the
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Guardian ad Litem's Report, Mr. Colleli filed his "Proposed Settlement" in which he
continued to insist that Ms. Colleli be responsible for transportation. (R. at 209)(A-11).
At the pretrial settlement conference with the Commissioner and at the pretrial conference
with the trial court, Mr. Colleli again refused to accept responsibility for transportation.
(R. at 620/Trial Tr. 45-46, 52-53)(A-l).
Throughout the entire proceedings in the trial court, it was Mr. Colleli who caused
the attorney fees to be greater than they otherwise might have been. There was nothing
more that Ms. Colleli could have done to shorten the proceedings below.

G. The trial court's belief that the transportation issue could have been
resolved amicably and more quickly is unsupported by the record and is
contrary to the evidence.
The trial court stated numerous times that the proceedings below could or should
have been resolved amicably or through compromise. See (R. at 620/Trial Tr.
at 58-59)(A-l); (R. at 621/Hearing Tr. at 5)(A-2).
Further, the trial court's Finding No. 19 states:
"Although [Ms. Colleli] ultimately prevailed on the substantive issues
on this case, the same result could have been reached by conducting
settlement discussions early in the case before the amount of attorney's
fees became a substantial impediment to settlement."
(R. at 299 %\9){emphasis added).
The trial court implies that not enough effort was made by Ms. Colleli to more
quickly resolve the dispute over transportation. But the trial court failed to review the
steps taken by the parties prior to trial.
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At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court exhibited its lack of knowledge:
"In fact, if the parties had gotten together, it very well should - could
have been resolved early on. I don't know whose responsibility the [sic]
way that happened."
(R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 58)(A-1).
The trial court seems to have overlooked entirely the fact that the parties attended
mediation very early in the proceedings. (R. at 115). After mediation in February 2002,
however, Mr. Colleli continued to insist that Ms. Colleli be responsible for transportation.
Id. Further, in March 2002, he filed a Rule 60(b) to remove from the Temporary Order
his obligation to provide transportation. (R. at 124). At his deposition in May 2002, he
continued to deny his responsibility for transportation. (R. at 186)(A-10). And in his
proposed settlement filed on June 12,2002, he still proposed that Ms. Colleli provide
transportation. (R. at 209)(A-11).
What more could Ms. Colleli have done? There was no compromise offered by
Mr. Colleli nor was any compromise possible. Either he accepted responsibility for
transportation or he did not. Until the day of trial, Mr. Colleli steadfastly clung to the
position that transportation was the responsibility of Ms. Colleli.
The trial court cites no actions taken by Ms. Colleli that impeded an amicable
resolution of the issue of transportation, nor did the trial court suggest any possible
actions that she might have taken to shorten or speed up the proceedings in the trial court.
In essence, the issue of transportation was not an issue subject to compromise. It was
not possible for Ms. Colleli to provide transportation some of the time or part way. Either
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Mr. Colleli was responsible for transportation or he was not. There was and is no middle
ground. Ms. Colleli has no means to provide transportation.
By the time of the pre-trial settlement conference with the Commissioner,
Ms. Colleli's attorney fees were $7,843. At that conference, Mr. Colleli offered a paltry
$900. (R. at 620/Trial Tr. at 67)(A-1). He maintained that offer through his Offer of
Judgment filed on December 13, 2002. (R. at 230).17 Mr. Colleli offered no compromise.
Compared with her actual fees of $7,843, his $900 offer was completely unreasonable. It
is not clear if the trial court is suggesting that Ms. Colleli should have compromised her
fees of $7,843 down to $900 or down to $3,000. The only way the dispute over fees
could have settled was for Ms. Colleli to accept $900. That is unrealistic and inequitable.
Although settlement discussions are normally inadmissible, Ms. Collei did offer to
resolve the transportation issue and the attorney fees issue at the settlement conference
with the Commissioner. While the transportation issue could not be compromised, the
attorney fees could. But Mr. Colleli remained as intransigent about not paying more than
$900 as he was about transportation. It appeared throughout the settlement conference
that Mr. Colleli would not agree on the transportation issue as long as he had to pay more
than $900 in attorney fees. He inextricably intertwined the two issues.

17

The Offer of Judgment was received shortly after December 13, 2002, and the
pre-trial conference was set for and held on December 23, 2002. Since there was no
resolution of any issues at the pre-trial conference, Ms. Colleli made a counteroffer on
December 24, 2002. The amount of $7,000 was considerably greater than the $900
offered for attorney fees, but far less than the actual fees incurred at that point.
(R. at 363-64). No further response or offer was ever received from Mr. Colleli.
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H. The trial court's reduction of fees is contrary to law and public policy.
The trial court suggests that there is something nefarious or unsavory about incurring
fees to obtain an award of fees. Such a suggestion is contrary to law and public policy.
In domestic cases like the proceedings below, the Legislature expressly provided for an
award of attorney fees. See § 30-3-3(1) and 5(6), U.C.A. (2002). (collectively the
"Statutes"). In effect, Utah's divorce laws are intended to deter bad behavior and to make
whole a prevailing party. See id.
When a court arbitrarily sets a fee that is only a small fraction of the actual fees, it
undermines the ability of disadvantaged individuals to access the courts and it fosters
disrespect for our judicial system. It also provides no disincentive for bad-acting parties.
In the instant case, Mr. Colleli knew or should have known that his intransigence could
very well come back to haunt him. He took that risk. He should not now be rewarded
with only a small fraction of the amount he could have been assessed.
Further, Utah's appellate courts have declared that "fees for fees" is permissible. In
Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court addressed
the issue of "fees for fees."
Although this court has not directly addressed the issue of whether fees
incurred in recovering fees allowed under a statute should also be
awarded pursuant to the statute, we agree with the rationale articulated
in American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local
3882 v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 301 U.S. App. D.C. 293,
994 F.2d 20 (D.C. Cir. 1993):
Federal courts have repeatedly recognized that the
unavailability of'Tees for fees1' could render fee-shifting
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provisions impotent, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the
underlying statutes. . . . An award of "fees for fees" is not
merely a remote descendant of the underlying action from
which it derives. Rather, it is an integral aspect of the
statutory scheme on which the underlying claim is based.
994 F.2d at 22; see also Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S.
154, 163-64, 110 L. Ed. 2d 134, 110 S. Ct. 2316 (1990);
Prandini v. National Tea Co., 585 F.2d 47, 53 (3d Cir. 1978);
Souza v. Southworth, 564 F.2d 609, 614 (1st Cir. 1977). This
rationale is {916 P.2d 896} consistent with our prior case law
awarding attorney fees for appeals where attorney fees are
initially authorized by statute. See First Southwestern
Financial Servs., 875 P.2d at 556.
Analogously, we have recognized that a contractual obligation
to pay attorney fees incurred in enforcing a contract should
also include fees incurred on appeal. In Management Services
v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406, 408-09 (Utah
1980), we stated that the purpose of an attorney fees provision
is to indemnify the prevailing party against the necessity of
paying attorney fees and thereby enable him to recover the
full amount of the obligation. Id. at 409. In accordance with
this purpose, we concluded that "a provision for payment of
attorneys fees in a contract includes attorney's fees incurred
by the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial, if the
action is brought to enforce the contract." Id. Similarly, the
court of appeals recently ruled that the prevailing party in a
dispute over a contractual attorney fees provision was
entitled, not only to attorney fees on appeal, but also to the
fees it incurred establishing the reasonableness of the fees for
which it was entitled to be indemnified. James Constructors
v. Salt Lake City, 888 P.2d 665, 674 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
If the fee-shifting provisions of the Statutes18 are to have their intended meaning, then
Ms. Colleli is entitled to her "actual" fees, including those fees incurred to show that

18

§ 30-3-3(1) and 5(6), U.CA. (2002)
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Mr. Colleli had sufficient financial means to pay her attorney fees. § 30-3-5(6), U.C.A.
("... the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and
court costs incurred by the prevailing party .. ")(emphasis added).
The trial court reduced the fee award based on its incorrect perception that the
proceedings below were mainly focused on Mr. Colleli's financial condition. It cited no
other activities nor any other factors that could be a basis for reducing Ms. Colleli's fees.
The trial court's reduction of fees is both plain error and clearly erroneous. This Court
should remand with instructions to the trial court to award all of Ms. Colleli's attorney
fees consistent with this Court's opinion, including those fees incurred at trial, during
post-trial proceedings and those incurred on appeal, with the only exception being
particularly itemized activities that are deemed unreasonable, but not including, however,
discovery activities to show Mr. Colleli's financial condition.
Based on all the evidence, the trial court's findings are not supported by the record,
are analytically flawed, and are contrary to Utah Law and public policy.

ISSUE NO. 2:
Whether the trial court erred in concluding that a Nevada order that
changed the child support obligation of the parties was ambiguous on
the question of whether the order also eliminated a previous award of
alimony in favor of Ms, Colleli
On February 6, 2003, the trial court entered an order denying Ms. Colleli's Motion
for Order to Show Cause for Mr. Colleli's failure to pay alimony. (R. at 113-14)(A-5).
In its order, the trial court stated:
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"The foreign [May Order] is ambiguous as to an award of alimony after
May 1999. It appears that the Nevada Court did not intend alimony
payments to continue beyond that date."
(R.atll4)(A-5).
The trial court's ruling referred to one of several Nevada orders filed with the Third
District Court. It is instructive to first review each of the Nevada documents filed with
the trial court. The original Decree, incorporated within the Nevada Court's Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce, dated October 3, 1997, provides
monthly alimony for Ms. Colleli in the amount of $450. (R. 74-78)(A-12). On
January 7, 1999, the Parties1 Stipulation to Modify Decree of Divorce was entered in the
Nevada Court. (R. at 70-71)(A-13). The Stipulation modified the amount and manner in
which alimony was to be calculated. The relevant part of the Stipulation is:
Alimony shall be reduced to a sum equivalent to the difference between
$600.00 and the amount of child support and payment on arrearages
ordered, so that [Mr. Colleli] pays by wage withholding the amount of
child support and arrearages ordered and pays to [Ms. Collei] directly a
sum to make the total monthly amount equal to $600.00, the difference
to be deemed alimony. Arrearages previously calculated and adjudged
should be revised to reflect only child supply. It is agreed that all
arrearages for spousal support are hereby waived up to and including the
month of November, 1998.
(R.at70)(A-13).
On February 9, 1999, the Stipulation was incorporated by the Nevada Court into an
Order Modifying Decree of Divorce (the "February Order"). (R. at 67-68)(A-14). The
relevant part of the February Order is:
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[Mr. CoUeli] shall pay to [Ms. CoUeli] the sum of $600.00 per month, of
which all sums in excess of the statutory child support and any payment
on arrearages shall be deemed alimony. At this time, ongoing child
support is $482.00, payment on arrearages is $50.00, and alimony is
$68.00.
(R.at67-68)(A-14).
Then on May 21, 1999, the Nevada Court entered a second Order Modifying Decree
of Divorce (Child Custody), (the "May Order"). This second modification reflects the
change in custody of the two minor children from Ms. CoUeli to Mr. CoUeli.
Accordingly, child support obligations were changed from Mr. CoUeli to Ms. CoUeli.
The relevant part of the May Order is:
[Ms. CoUeli] shall pay to [Mr. CoUeli] a sum equivalent to 25% of her
gross monthly income, but in any event not less than $100 per child, as
and for support of the minor children, until the children reach the age of
18 or are otherwise emancipated. The sum of $ 100 per month per child
is the appropriate sum for child support at this time.
(R.at2-4)(A-15).

The May Order speaks for itself, but Ms. CoUeli contends that it is not ambiguous
and contains no intention to eliminate alimony. The trial court's interpretation of a prior
judicial order constitutes a conclusion of law. See Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co.,
918 P.2d 461,464 (Utah 1996). And whether a writing is ambiguous or not is a
conclusion of law. See Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1251 (Utah 1998).
The May Order clearly changes the child support obligations of the parties. While
the child support obligation was changed from Mr. CoUeli to Ms. CoUeli, the May Order
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is entirely silent on the issue of alimony. The trial court apparently believed that if the
child support obligation was transferred from Mr. Colleli to Ms. Colleli, alimony for
Ms. Colleli was eliminated. But there is not a hint of such intent in the May Order.
Further, the caption on the May Order identifies the nature of its modification as
"Child Custody." (R. at 1)(A-15).
There is no basis in law to support a linkage between a need for child support and a
need for alimony. They are two separate issues. Child support is intended for the benefit
of minor children. Alimony is intended for the benefit of a former spouse. The May
Order is void of any reference to Ms. Colleli's needs. Although the custody of the
children was transferred from Ms. Colleli to Mr. Colleli and along with that transfer the
child support obligation was transferred, the need for alimony was not changed, or at least
there is no evidence that Ms. Colleli's need for alimony changed. The plain language of
the May Order suggests no intent to change the obligation for alimony.
The trial court apparently reasoned that the Nevada court mistakenly failed to deal
with the issue of alimony but that had the Nevada court done so, it would have eliminated
alimony. That reasoning reads far too much into the intent of the Nevada court. Without
more, the trial court's finding of ambiguity is without merit.
The trial court was in error and this Court should reverse the trial court's
interpretation of the May Order. The effect of such reversal will permit Ms. Colleli to
renew her Motion for Order to Show Cause for unpaid alimony.
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ISSUE NO. 3:
Whether the trial court erred in concluding as a matter of law that
Ms. Colleli 's failure to previously make a request for alimony now bars
her from seeking any reimbursement for such unpaid alimony.
After finding ambiguity in the May Order,19 the trial court applied the doctrine of
laches and denied Ms. Colleli's Motion for Order to Show Cause. (R. at 113-14)(A-5). In
its order, the trial court stated:
"Given the ambiguity of the [May Order], and given [Ms. Colleli's]
failure to make any request for alimony since May 1999, the court finds
that [Ms. Colleli] is estopped from seeking any reimbursement for
alimony and therefore denies her motion."
(R.atll4)(A-5).
The issue of ambiguity was presented under Issue No. 2. The issue of estoppel is
now presented.
The trial court reasoned that Ms. Colleli is estopped from seeking to collect alimony
because she failed to make a claim for alimony during the two and one-half years since
the entry of the February Order. Such reasoning is contrary to Utah Law.
In Adams v. Adams, 593 P.2d 147 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court found that a
wife was not estopped to assert her claim for unpaid alimony merely because she had
been silent and did not claim it for a period of five and one-half years, where she had no
duty to speak, had not misled her husband in any way, and the husband had not changed
his position to his detriment in reliance on any representations by the wife. Id. at 148.

19

See Issue No. 2.
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In the instant case, Ms. Colleli no longer resided in the State of Nevada at the time
Mr. Colleli filed his motion to modify and when the February Order was entered.20 She
suffered and still suffers from Multiple Sclerosis and had no reasonable means to retain
legal counsel to represent her. Moreover, since the entry of the February Order,
Petitioner has not been employed and has had no financial means to assert her claim for
alimony. The trial court's conclusion that Petitioner is now estopped from collecting
unpaid alimony, merely on the basis that she made no prior claim, is without any legal
support under Utah Law.
Accordingly, the trial court erred, and this court should reverse the trial court's order
and permit Ms. Colleli to pursue her claim for unpaid alimony.

ISSUE NO. 4:
Whether the trial court erred when it concluded that the provisions of
§ 78-45-7.15(8), U.C.A., are not applicable to a Nevada decree of
divorce, even though Mr. Colleli first sought jurisdiction in the State of
Utah by registering the foreign decree and then sought to enforce the
decree against Ms. Colleli for one half of the medical bills paid by him.
Divorced parents generally share equally the medical bills paid for their minor
children. However, § 78-45-7.15(8), U.C.A., mandates that the party seeking
reimbursement for such medical bills provide timely written verification to the other
party:

20

The February Order was the order that changed the formula for calculating the
amount of alimony for Ms. Colleli.
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A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written
verification of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other
parent within 30 days of payment.
§ 78-45-7.15(8), U.CA. (emphasis added).
The penalty for a party who fails to timely provide such written verification may be a
denial of reimbursement:
In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, a parent
incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for
the expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that
parent fails to comply with Subsections (7) and (8).
§78-45-7.15(9), U.C.A.

In the instant case, Ms. Colleli attempted to use § 78-45-7.15(8) and (9), U.CA., in
her defense against Mr. Colleli's request for reimbursement of one-half of the medical
bills he allegedly incurred from 1999 to February 2003. However, the Commissioner
refused to consider § 78-45-7.15, U.CA., as a defense. Subsequently, the trial court ruled
that since the Decree was void of the notice or reporting requirements imposed by
§ 78-45-7.15(8), U.CA., the penalty available in § 78-45-7.15(9), U.CA., is not available
to Ms. Colleli. (R. at 587-88)(A-7).21 The trial court then approved the recommendation
of the Commissioner. Id.

21

At hearing with the Commissioner, the Commissioner expressly denied the use
of § 78-45-7.15(8) and (9), U.CA., as a defense. After a hearing in the trial court, the
actual order entered by the trial court transformed the wording into giving "full faith and
credit to the Nevada Decree" and approving the Commissioner's refusal to grant
Mr. Colleli's motion for reimbursement without consideration of § 78-45-7.15(8), U.CA.
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The trial court's choice of law constitutes a conclusion of law. See Wilde v. Wilde,
969 P.2d 438, 442 (Utah Ct App. 1998); Shaw v. Layton Constr. Co.,
872 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Accordingly, this Court should review this
issue with no deference to the trial court. See Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah
1998); Rackley v. Fairview Care Ctrs., Inc., 970 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah Ct App. 1998).
In deciding this issue, this Court should note that Mr. Colleli first sought the
protection of Utah's courts by registering the Nevada Order in Utah. Mr. Colleli invoked
the jurisdiction of Utah's courts and Utah's laws, including Utah's § 78-45f-100, et seq,
U.C.A., and known as the "Utah Interstate Family Support Act." ("UIFSA").
Two simple examples illustrate the inconsistency of the trial court: (1) the schedule
for parenting time; and (2) the award of attorney fees. The trial court did not look to
Nevada Law to establish a schedule for parenting time nor did the trial court look to
Nevada Law in awarding attorney fees. Instead, the trial court looked only to Utah Law.
Why then would the trial court feel compelled to avoid Utah Law in deciding whether
Mr. Colleli had to comply with the requirements imposed by § 78-45-7.15, U.CA.? The
trial court's position is inconsistent and illogical.
Moreover, UIFSA (in particular, § 78-45f-100, et seq, U.CA.)(A-16)) requires the
trial court to apply Utah Law. Medical bills constitute a "support order" under UIFSA.
§ 78-45f-101(22), U.CA. (A-16). The trial court is a "responding tribunal," since Utah is
the "responding state." § 78-45f-101(16)-(17), -102, U.CA. Therefore, § 78-45f-303,
U.C.A., requires the trial court to "apply the procedural and substantive law" of Utah:
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Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, a responding tribunal
of this state shall:
(1) apply the procedural and substantive law, including the rules on
choice of law, generally applicable to similar proceedings originating in
this state and may exercise all powers and provide all remedies available
in those proceedings; and
(2) determine the duty of support and the amount payable in
accordance with the law and support guidelines of this state.

This Court should reverse the trial court on its choice of law and remand for a
determination of whether Mr. Colleli should be denied reimbursement for Ms. Colleli's
share of medical bills for the minor children.

CONCLUSIONS and RELIEF SOUGHT
Issue No. 1: The sufficiency of the trial court's findings to support its reduction of
attorney fees is inadequate. First, the trial court cites only a single entry in billing records
that contain 15 pages. Second, the trial court heavily relies on its "extracted copy" of
Mr. Colleli's deposition, which was missing 25% of its pages. Further, the trial court
erred when it wrongly suggested that fees incurred in discovery of Mr. Colleli's true
financial condition should not be awarded. The trial court's reduction of fees is contrary
to Utah Law and against public policy. On Issue No. 1, Ms. Colleli requests this Court to
remand to the trial court for a proper determination of attorney fees, including all fees
incurred during trial, post-trial, on appeal, and during post-appeal activities in support of
proving fees.
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Issue No. 2: The trial court erred when (a) it found the May Nevada Order to be
ambiguous; and (b) linked a change in child support with a need for alimony. First, the
May Order is not ambiguous and it is entirely silent on the issue of alimony. Second,
child support and alimony are two separate issues. On Issue No. 2, Ms. Colleli requests
this Court to reverse the trial court and permit her to pursue collection of unpaid alimony.
Issue No. 3: The trial court erred in denying Ms. Colleli's request for unpaid
alimony when it ruled that she was estopped from seeking such alimony. This is contrary
to established law in Utah. On Issue No. 3, Ms. Colleli requests this Court to reverse the
trial court and permit her to pursue collection of unpaid alimony.
Issue No. 4: The trial court erred when it ruled that Utah's domestic laws do not
apply to a Nevada Decree, particularly when Mr. Colleli registered the May Order with
the trial court. UIFSA requires the trial court to apply Utah Law. On Issue No. 4,
Ms. Colleli requests this Court to reverse the trial court and permit her to renew her
objection to Mr. Colleli's request for reimbursement for medical bills allegedly paid by
him from 1999 through February 2003.

Finally, this Court should also award Ms. Colleli her attorney fees and costs on
appeal.
DATED this 4th day of February 2004.
<T/^^r-

Michael A. Jensen 0723 U
Counsel for Appel4nVMs. Colleli
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Addendum 5

Order (denying unpaid alimony). (2/6/02). (R. at 113-14).
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Addendum 8
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Addendum 12
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Addendum 13
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Addendum 14
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Addendum 15
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Addendum 16

Uniform Interstate Family Support Act ("UIFSA")
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